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A HISTORY OF TAX REGULATION PRIOR TO
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ABSTRACT
The relationship of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
tax administration has been the subject of increasing scrutiny from
scholars and courts. Some of this scrutiny has critiqued the long-held
view of the Department of Treasury that tax regulations issued under
the general grant of authority in I.R.C. § 7805(a) are interpretative
regulations within the meaning of the APA. This Article reviews the
almost 150-year history of tax administration before the enactment of
the APA to show the origins and basis for this long-held view. The
Article also argues that the application of the general terms of the
APA to tax administration must be informed by this pre–APA history
of tax regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2014 Duke Law Journal Administrative Law Symposium is
titled “Taking Administrative Law to Tax.” The title flows from some
excellent recent scholarship that properly urges those who study and
practice tax administration to be more aware of general
administrative-law principles. This same scholarship, however, has
created a constraining conceptual box labeled “tax exceptionalism.”
The idea is that tax administration has been granted exceptional
treatment in the application of the law and thus now operates outside
the bounds of administrative law in general and the Administrative
1
Procedure Act (APA) in particular.
This Article pushes back. This Symposium could have been titled
“Taking Tax to Administrative Law.” As this Article argues, general
principles of administrative law can be, and indeed since the early
nineteenth century have been, informed by the particulars of tax
administration. The APA contains general commands about how
agencies must make rules. Surely no one doubts that the APA applies
to the agencies charged with administering tax laws. But the APA is
neither the source nor the summation of administrative-law
principles. An exploration of pre–APA administrative law helps to
understand both what the law is and what the law should be.
Professors Jerry Mashaw and Ann Woolhandler, among others, have
2
studied early administrative law on a broader scale. Their studies,
however, do not give much attention to tax administration. Thus this
study fills a bit of a gap there as well.
The goal of this Article is to reorient the discussion about the
relationship of tax administration and administrative law away from
metaphysical abstractions about legislative rules and interpretative
rules and toward a more concrete understanding of where those terms
came from. This Article’s review of the intellectual history of tax
administration may help general administrative-law scholars and

1. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012).
2. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative
Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008) [hereinafter Mashaw,
Administration and “The Democracy”]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal
Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636
(2007) [hereinafter Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists]; Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1991).
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others at least start in the right place. Part I delineates the current tax
exceptionalism claim to which this Article responds. Parts II and III
then review the legal history of tax administration up to the APA to
show how the idea of tax regulations evolved and suggest why it was
commonly believed that the APA requirements of notice and
comment did not generally apply to tax regulations.
I. THE GUIDANCE PROBLEM AND THE TAXEXCEPTIONALISM CLAIM
A. The Problems of Issuance and Authority
An important part of any agency’s work is to guide employees, as
well as the regulated community, on how to both apply and comply
3
with the law the agency administers. Agency guidance includes a
variety of documents meant for internal or external use, some labeled
“regulations” and some given other labels. However denominated,
this guidance presents problems both of issuance and authority. The
first problem concerns how an agency must publicize and disseminate
the rules for compliance. The second problem concerns how courts
should review guidance when someone disputes its validity. Problems
of issuance and authority are present both in administrative law
generally and in tax law in particular.
Contrary to popular belief, the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) is not the agency Congress made responsible for
administering the tax laws. Rather, Congress has placed the awesome
responsibility of administering the entire tax system on the Secretary
4
of the Treasury (Secretary) —and with that awesome responsibility
comes awesome powers. Every Secretary since Alexander Hamilton,
5
however, has delegated those powers to a spectrum of subordinates.
6
Since 1862 one of those subordinates has been the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (Commissioner), whose position is currently

3. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (describing the authority of agencies to “elucidate a specific provision of [a] statute by
regulation”). Although agencies exercise many different powers, this Article focuses on their
power to issue guidance. Agency power to adjudicate is the other main branch of study in
administrative law. This Article does not consider that subject.
4. I.R.C. § 7801(a)(1) (2012).
5. See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text; see also Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists,
supra note 2, at 1669 (discussing how, in the early operation of the Treasury Department,
Secretary Gallatin used circulars to delegate authority to the collectors, among other purposes).
6. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432, 432–33.
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codified at § 7803 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).
I.R.C. § 7803, however, generally grants the Commissioner only the
8
“duties and powers as the Secretary may prescribe.” The Secretary
has broadly delegated to the Commissioner the responsibility “for the
9
administration and enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws.” In
turn, the Commissioner has delegated some of these responsibilities
10
to other subordinates.
With the authority to administer and enforce comes the authority
to issue guidance. Congress has given general authority to the
Secretary to make “all needful rules and regulations for the
11
enforcement of this title.” In addition, Congress has specifically
reiterated the Secretary’s power to make rules in hundreds of specific
12
sections of the I.R.C. With thousands of separate sections in the
I.R.C. to administer and approximately one hundred thousand
employees to administer them, the number and variety of guidance
documents is overwhelming and constantly changing. At any one time
there are between ten and twenty categories of documents that are
used by Service employees and the public to guide their
13
understanding of and compliance with the tax laws.
Most of these guidance documents are issued by offices within
the Service. Typical of these are revenue rulings, revenue procedures,
service announcements, Office of Chief Counsel notices, actions on
decision, general counsel memoranda, forms, form instructions,
publications, and that capacious compendium containing reams of

7. I.R.C. § 7803(a) (2012).
8. Id. § 7803(a)(2).
9. I.R.S. Treas. Order 150-10 (Apr. 22, 1982), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/
role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/to150-10.aspx.
10. The Commissioner’s delegation of various powers to various subordinates are collected
and published in the Internal Revenue Manual. See IRM 1.2.40–.64.
11. I.R.C. § 7805(a).
12. Professor John Coverdale writes that there are more than a thousand such sections.
John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era,
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 52 (1995). Professor Kristin Hickman writes that there are several
hundred. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1727, 1735 & nn.37–38 (2007) (citing her own search, which resulted in 293 such grants of
authority, and another study, which claimed over 550 hits).
13. See Peter A. Lowy, U.S. Federal Tax Research, 100-2d Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) A23 (2011) (“The body of guidance emanating from the IRS is a constantly changing collection of
documents. At any one time, it may include anywhere from 10–20 different types and forms of
guidance, like revenue rulings, general counsel memoranda, field service advice, and
publications.”).
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rules, the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM). Some of these office
documents are meant for public use. Others are written for internal
use but are made public thanks to the tireless efforts of the nonprofit
14
organization Tax Analysts, Inc.
One important subset of guidance documents, Treasury
Regulations, are issued only after the review and approval of U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) personnel outside the
15
Service. Treasury Regulations are drafted by attorneys in the Office
of Chief Counsel of the Service in coordination with the various
16
Service offices affected by the subject matter of the regulation.
These regulations are not promulgated, however, until they are
substantively reviewed by personnel within Treasury, a process that
17
ends only with the decision of the Secretary. One common mistake is
18
to refer to Treasury Regulations as “IRS regulations.” This habit
creates potentially unreliable analyses of administrative-law concerns
and overlooks a potentially useful functional distinction between
types of guidance documents.

14. Tax Analysts is a nonprofit organization that has sued the government multiple times
to secure the release of “secret” law in the form of internal memoranda. History of Tax
Analysts, TAX ANALYSTS, http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/website.nsf/Web/HistoryOfTax
Analysts (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
15. For an overview of the entire process through which Treasury Regulations are
implemented, see 1 MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 3.02[2] (rev. 2d
ed. 2005).
16. See IRM 32.1.1.4.4 (Aug. 11, 2004) (“The Office of Associate Chief Counsel is solely
responsible for issuing published guidance. However, on some projects, members of Operating
Divisions may be involved in the development of a project.”); see also Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)
(as amended in 1987) (“Regulations . . . are prepared in the Office of the Chief Counsel.”).
17. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a) (“The most important rules are issued as regulations and
Treasury decisions prescribed by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary or his
delegate. . . . After approval by the Commissioner, regulations and Treasury decisions are
forwarded to the Secretary or his delegate for further consideration and final approval.”).
18. See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and IRS
Regulations, 136 TAX NOTES 271, 274 (2012) (discussing the decision in Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), but referring to the
Treasury Regulations at issue there as “IRS regulations”). Experienced federal district judges
also misuse the term. See, e.g., Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-0623 (PLF), 2014 WL 129023, at *28
(D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014) (“[P]laintiffs here bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a final agency
rule, rather than individualized adjudications of tax liability. The dispute before the Court is
purely legal and ripe for review. Any administrative challenge would be futile, as the Secretary
of the Treasury can be expected to deny plaintiffs’ complaint as contrary to the issued IRS
regulations.”). There are indeed “IRS regulations.” That is, the Service does issue guidance
without the review and approval of Treasury, which is published in the Federal Register and the
Code of Federal Regulations. This guidance is labeled “Procedural Rules” and is found in Part
601 of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
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However denominated, all of these tax guidance documents are
“rules” under the APA. That is because the APA definition of rule is
exceedingly broad: a rule is any “agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
19
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” Though the APA separates
rules into various subclassifications—policy statements or
interpretative rules, for example—the broad definition of rule sweeps
every conceivable agency guidance document within the ambit of the
APA’s operation.
B. Issuance, Authority, and the New Orthodoxy
Both courts and commentators have claimed that tax-guidance
documents—most notably Treasury Regulations—have erroneously
escaped application of general administrative-law principles, as to
both issuance and authority. This critique, though not without its
precursors, has become something of a new orthodoxy among tax
scholars and courts.
1. Recent Examples. Most recent examples of this phenomenon
deal with the problem of authority. The Supreme Court, for instance,
addressed the authority problem in the 2011 case Mayo Foundation
20
for Medical Education & Research v. United States. There, the
taxpayer argued that the Supreme Court should evaluate a Treasury
Regulation under a standard of deference the Court had articulated
specifically for tax regulations in National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v.
21
United States. The Court instead decided to use Chevron deference,
22
the same standard used to evaluate regulations from other agencies.
The Court’s opinion noted that the taxpayer “has not advanced any
justification for applying a less deferential standard of review to
Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any
23
other agency.” Without such justification, the Court was “not

19. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012); cf. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund
Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142–43 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that a Service notice violated the
APA’s notice-and-comment requirement for rules).
20. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. 704.
21. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
22. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
23. Id. at 713.
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inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for
24
tax law only.”
Commentators have lauded the Supreme Court’s Mayo decision
for “dispos[ing] of tax exceptionalism, the notion that tax
administration is exempt from the rules governing other areas of
25
regulation.” Pointing to Mayo, Professor Steve Johnson has argued
that courts should evaluate the recent attempt to regulate tax-return
preparers by the same standards used to review the attempts of other
agencies to change long-held interpretations of statutes, such as the
26
Food and Drug Administration’s attempt to regulate tobacco.
As to the problem of issuance, Professor Kristin Hickman’s 2007
study of 232 tax regulations has convinced her that tax regulations are
routinely issued in violation of the APA under what she characterizes
27
as misguided claims for exceptional treatment. She has since
followed up with a careful study of the force-of-law concept to
identify when tax regulations must follow the APA notice-and28
comment process.
More recently, the D.C. Circuit has joined the tax-exceptionalism
29
parade. In Cohen v. United States, the court decided that there is
nothing special enough about tax administration to justify
reading § 702 of the APA any differently for suits challenging tax
30
regulations than other types of regulations. In Cohen, taxpayers
asked the court to invalidate a refund procedure the Service had

24. Id. Apparently the Supreme Court had not read Professor John Coverdale’s excellent
article on just this point. See generally Coverdale, supra note 12 (arguing against the Chevron
standard and for an administrative review specific to tax law only).
25. Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA.
TAX REV. 269, 279 (2012).
26. Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Return Preparation,
60 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 66–70), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326526; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 142–43 (2000) (invalidating the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products).
27. Hickman, supra note 12, at 1728–31. Most of the violations Professor Hickman finds
relate to the immediate issuance of temporary regulations. Id. at 1759. She explores the
historical justifications the Treasury has given for its issuing temporary regulations without
notice and comment and concludes that these are claims for exceptional treatment that do not
survive critical study. See id. at 1759–86.
28. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 542
(2013).
29. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
30. Id. at 723.
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created and announced in a document called “Notice 2006–50” on
the grounds that it “did not comply with the notice and comment
32
procedures required under the [APA].” The en banc majority first
rejected the government’s attempt to assert sovereign immunity,
albeit not with the clearest syntax: “The IRS is not special in this
regard; no exception exists shielding it—unlike the rest of the Federal
33
Government—from suit under the APA.” It then turned to the
government’s argument that the taxpayers should do exactly what
taxpayers have traditionally had to do: file a refund claim, then test
34
the Service’s denial of the claim in court. Siding with the taxpayers,
the court drew on general administrative-law precedents to hold that
because the taxpayers’ challenge was to the adequacy of the IRS’s
procedures, they need not overcome an exhaustion requirement to
35
obtain equitable relief.
The court of appeals went on to find that Notice 2006–50
operated as a substantive rule because it was “bind[ing]” on the IRS
36
and taxpayers alike. On remand, the District Court used that finding
to hold that Notice 2006–50 should have been promulgated as a
37
regulation using notice and comment procedures.
This is the new orthodoxy: it is wrong to treat tax administration
differently from the work of other administrative agencies. There is
no better evidence of orthodoxy than to find the idea encapsulated in
a student note that dutifully summarizes the story this way: “For
years, generally applicable administrative law was not applied to
38
taxation under the doctrine of tax exceptionalism.”

31. Id. at 720–21; see generally I.R.S. Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141 (describing the
reasons for the refund and procedures for obtaining one).
32. Cohen, 650 F.3d at 721. The taxpayers also challenged Notice 2006–50 as being
“substantively flawed because it undercompensates many taxpayers for the actual excise taxes
paid.” Id.
33. Id. at 723. The D.C. Circuit chided the government for its tax administration insularity:
“The IRS envisions a world in which no challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed loop of
its taxing authority.” Id. at 726.
34. Id. at 731.
35. See id. at 731–33 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147–49 (1992); Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 60–62 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1973)).
36. Id. at 723.
37. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138, 143
(D.D.C. 2012).
38. Recent Case, Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1747 (2013).
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2. Precursors to the New Orthodoxy. The current crop of critics
is not the first to caution tax lawyers about the need to understand
more general principles of administrative law, as to either the
problem of issuance or the problem of authority. In 1926, writing in
National Income Tax Magazine, attorney J. Hardy Patten started off
his three-part study of judicial review of tax regulations with the
observation that “there is no field in which the scope and extent of
39
court review is so unsettled as in internal revenue taxation.” He
urged his readers to remember that tax administration “has as its
background the application of the basic principles of administrative
and constitutional law” and that these areas of law were “too often
40
neglected by the practicing tax lawyer.”
Similarly, some fifteen years after Patten first explored the
problem, eminent scholars debated what they termed “the regulations
41
problem,” that is, “the problem of the effect which should be given
to Treasury Regulations in the construction and application of the
42
Federal Revenue Acts.” Much of this debate was over the usefulness
of the reenactment doctrine, which seemed exceptionally applicable
to tax administration due to the frequency of congressional
43
reenactment of taxing statutes in the years before codification.
3. A Critique. The new orthodoxy is troublesome to me because
it skews the relationship between the APA and the organic statute—
here, the I.R.C.—by assuming that the APA is the proper starting
point for determining the proper relationship between tax and
administrative law. That is, scholars start their analyses with the
APA. They then tend to measure the compliance of tax
administration with “administrative law” by its compliance with
39. J. Hardy Patten, Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations, 4 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG.
373, 373 (1926).
40. Id.
41. Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398, 400
(1941).
42. Id. at 398; see also A.H. Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 1311 (1941) (responding to Professor Erwin Griswold’s article); cf. Louis Eisenstein, Some
Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L. REV. 477, 535 (1945) (“[T]he
present state of administrative paralysis is attributable . . . to a variety of interlocking factors,
such as the concept of specific legislative intention, the virtual delegation of administrative
power to the courts, and an awkward system of appellate review which is conducive to confusion
rather than administration.”).
43. See Feller, supra note 42, at 1314 (“The factor which differentiates tax administration is
the periodic reenactment of the basic statute.”). For further discussion, see infra notes 209–13
and accompanying text.
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specific provisions of the APA. Only then do they look to see
whether the organic statute trumps the APA. In short, these scholars
use a top-down approach that presumes that the APA is the primary
source of law regulating administrative behavior, and they fail to
44
consider what came before the APA.
One example of this approach is Professor Hickman’s close study
45
of Treasury Regulations. Hickman studies 232 separate Treasury
regulatory projects and concludes that “[a]lmost as often as not,
Treasury does not follow the traditional APA-required pattern of
issuing [a notice of proposed rulemaking], accepting and considering
46
public comments, and only then publishing its final regulations.” She
comes to this conclusion by counting how many of the regulatory
47
projects used the APA’s traditional notice-and-comment process.
She then examines those projects that did not use the notice-andcomment process to see whether they fell within any of the statutory
48
exceptions created by the APA. She carefully considers what she
calls the “interpretive rule exception,” the “procedural rule
exception,” and the “good cause exception,” and concludes that none
49
apply.
Professor Hickman’s study relies on the notion that “[t]he APA
50
is the law.” She starts with the APA as her baseline. Only then does
she consider provisions in the I.R.C. that, in her view, “supplement
51
APA section 553.” Notably, she considers I.R.C. § 7805—a general
grant of rulemaking authority—and questions whether that section
gives an “I.R.C.-specific departure from APA rulemaking
52
requirements.” In particular she examines whether § 7805(e)
represents “a tax-specific exception from APA rulemaking
53
requirements” and concludes it does not.
44. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 499, 572 (2011) (“In view of these legislative balances, whether agency-specific
precedents are legally justified depends on the extent to which distinctive features of the agency
justify deviation or variation from the consistent and universal application of the APA and
other generally applicable administrative law.”).
45. See generally Hickman, supra note 12.
46. Id. at 1730.
47. Id. at 1730, 1744–48.
48. Id. at 1745.
49. See id. at 1760, 1773, 1778, 1786.
50. Id. at 1795 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 1735.
52. Id. at 1738.
53. Id. at 1740.
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Professor Leandra Lederman follows the same reasoning in her
study of what deference courts owe to “‘fighting’ regulation[s]”—that
is, those regulations promulgated during litigation and then used as a
54
sword in the litigation. Lederman aims to compare deference
standards for regulations generally with deference standards for tax
55
regulations.
She begins her analysis with the claim that
“administrative law recognizes two categories of rules—legislative
56
and interpretative—that receive different levels of deference.” She
locates that distinction, however, in the APA, which is the starting
57
point for her inquiry.
Certainly some scholars have argued vigorously that the APA
58
should be the sum and substance of administrative law. I disagree, at
least with respect to tax administration. Analysis of tax guidance—
whether considering how guidance should be issued or how courts
should weigh it—should not start with the APA. Instead, the proper
place to start is with the precedents established in tax-administration
59
cases. Though the APA is a law, it is not the law. The APA was built
on already existing concepts, notably the concepts of legislative

54. Leandra Lederman, The Fight over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax
Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 648 (2012).
55. Id. at 649.
56. Id. It is interesting that the earliest cases I could find in which a federal court used the
exact term “interpretative regulation” came in pre–APA tax cases. See Comm’r v. Bryn Mawr
Trust Co., 87 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1936) (“It will thus be seen that two Circuit Courts of
Appeals have interpreted the statute to refer only to a consideration benefiting the decedent
and have in effect added to the statutory definition of consideration the clause ‘received
therefor by the decedent’ which the Commissioner actually did add to his interpretative
regulation.”); see also Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 113–14 (1939)
(holding that the term “gross income” was “so general in its terms as to render an interpretative
regulation appropriate”).
57. See Lederman, supra note 54, at 649 (“Under current law, the [APA] is the principal
source of the legislative/interpretative distinction.” (footnote omitted)).
58. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 113, 115 (1998). Professor John Duffy argues descriptively that “this administrative
common law of judicial review is beginning to abate; it is being replaced, albeit slowly, by
doctrine grounded in the judicial review provisions of the APA and other statutes.” Id. He also
argues that the move from common law to statutory law is, in general, a good thing. Id.
59. I thus disagree with Professors Richard Levy and Robert Glicksman’s intriguing article
to the extent that it suggests that agency-specific precedent is undesirable. Cf. Levy &
Glicksman, supra note 44, at 500 (“The proliferation of agency-specific precedents creates
anomalies and inconsistencies in some cases and hampers the development of administrative
law in others.”). I instead join those who believe that application of general principles of
administrative law will look different when applied to different agencies.
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60

regulations and interpretative regulations. These concepts came into
the law influenced by the history of tax guidance.
Unlike these past attempts to reconcile tax administration with
principles of administrative law, the new orthodoxy is troublesome in
no small part because it skews the relationship between the APA and
the organic statute by overlooking the history of tax-guidance
doctrines. By taking administrative law to tax—that is, by starting
with the APA and only then looking to see whether tax guidance is
special—the new orthodoxy risks distorting the proper relationship
between tax administration and general administrative-law principles.
61
The world of the APA started in 1947, but the world of U.S. tax
62
administration began in 1789. An understanding of that history is
necessary for a proper understanding of the relationship between
administrative law and tax. The next section seeks to explain that
history.

60. I use the word “interpretative” as a complete synonym with “interpretive.” I have
always wondered why the APA uses the five-syllable word instead of the four-syllable word.
There is no explanation for the choice of terminology in either the Attorney General’s Final
Report on the APA, see ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941), or the
Attorney General’s Manual, see TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947). Judge Milton
Shadur concluded in 1988 that it was just a stylistic point. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States,
688 F. Supp. 358, 361 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1988). I agree. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century courts
used the word “interpretative” as a synonym for “constructive,” as in “[c]onstructive, or
interpretative treasons.” United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277, 1279 (Paterson, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 15,788). It was also used as a more direct synonym for
“interpretive” in describing the ability of courts to construe a statute. See, e.g., Trs. of the Phila.
Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Ex’rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1, 18 (1819), overruled by Vidal v. Girard’s
Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844). For example, Hart’s Executors involved the question of
whether an English statute, repealed after the creation of a will, could save a bequest that would
be void but for operation of the statute. Id. at 2–3. The Court there asked, “If, then, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over charitable bequests, cannot be derived from the letter
of the statute of Eliz., can it be supported from ancient adjudged cases, interpretative of that
statute?” Id. at 17–18 (emphasis added). In the latter part of the nineteenth century
“interpretative” appeared mostly in patent disputes, in which courts asked what interpretative
effect various phrases used in patent claims have on the scope of the patent protection. See, e.g.,
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Sterling Cork & Seal Co., 217 F. 381, 387 (6th Cir. 1914). Only in a
few cases, however, was the term “interpretative” used in the sense we think of “interpretive” in
today’s administrative-law lexicon—as a term to describe a power that is not legislative power.
See, e.g., The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 61–62 (1821) (“[The Court’s] province is
interpretative, as in the case of other laws and it can no more assume the treaty-making power,
than any other legislative power.”).
61. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)).
62. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.
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II. TAX GUIDANCE FROM 1789 TO 1862
It is commonly assumed that the Interstate Commerce
63
Commission (ICC), established in 1887, was the first regulatory
64
agency. This assumption is correct in the important sense that tax
administration is not the same kind of “regulation” as that done by
the ICC and other agencies created after 1887. Moreover, the very
existence of this assumption reinforces one of the points this Article
seeks to make: tax is different.
This assumption is incorrect, however, in the nontrivial sense
that it undervalues tax administration’s pre–Civil War impact on the
development of general administrative-law principles.
One significant administrative-law development prior to the Civil
War was the explicit acknowledgement that administrative
departments could issue regulations. Tax law played an important
role in how courts worked out the legal effect of such administrative
65
regulations.
Between 1789 and 1862, Congress filled the federal fisc mainly
through external taxes, in the form of tariffs, or customs duties,
66
imposed on imported goods. Congress divided the country into

63. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383.
64. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 950 (2011) (“The
creation in 1887 of the first major national regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, reflected a similar pattern.”). This is a longstanding assumption. See Frederic P.
Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEO. L.J. 287, 297 (1948)
(“In 1887 [Congress] entered on a program of vesting the executive with broad regulatory
powers over economic and social matters of national concern, and enacted the original
Interstate Commerce Act. During the half century and more since that date a network of
important economic and social regulatory measures has been spread over the pages of the
Statutes at Large.”).
65. It appears, in fact, that until the mid-twentieth century, the usual association of the
term “regulation” was with statutory provisions and not administrative rules. For example,
section 5 of the Tariff Act of 1789 provided: “[I]t shall be the duty of the collector to receive all
reports, manifests and documents made or exhibited to him by the master or commander of any
ship or vessel, conformably to the regulations prescribed by this act.” Act of July 31, 1789, ch.
5, § 5, 1 Stat. 29, 36.
66. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1945, at 295–98 ser. P 89–98 (1949). My thanks to the Duke Law
Journal editors who ran this table through a spreadsheet to calculate that tariffs made up
approximately 85 percent of federal revenue until the Civil War. The table shows that the other
15 percent came mostly from land sales. For a short period of time, Congress did impose some
modest internal excise taxes on those who produced certain tobacco and alcohol products. See
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 246 (Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel &
Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2d ed. 2005). As I learned in sixth grade, the farmers of the Whiskey
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collection districts, each one headed by a collector of customs,
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
67
Senate. These taxes were collected based on identification and
68
valuation of the goods subject to tax.
Early tariff administration was chiefly regulated by statute, and
69
not by what we would now consider administrative regulations. The
First Congress filled twenty pages in the Statutes at Large with
70
detailed instructions on tariff administration. Within days of his
confirmation as the first Secretary in 1789, Alexander Hamilton was
71
writing letters to various collectors of customs, giving directions.
These handwritten letters were meant to be circulated to all other
72
collectors and thus were titled “circulars.” In response to some
doubt over Hamilton’s authority, Congress provided in the Tariff Act
73
of 1792 “[t]hat the Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the
superintendence of the collection of the duties on impost and tonnage
74
as he shall judge best.” This was the only statutory direction given as
to the scope of administrative power over taxes that I found before
1832.
75
Hamilton issued over sixty circulars during his time in office.
However, they appear to have had little effect on the day-to-day
76
operations of tax. Actual implementation of the circulars tended to
be local, with each collector “allowed to use his own common sense
Rebellion did not think these excise taxes so modest. MARGARET G. MACKEY, YOUR
COUNTRY’S HISTORY 173 (1966).
67. John Dean Goss, A History of Tariff Administration in the United States, from Colonial
Times to the McKinley Administration Bill, in 1 STUDIES IN HISTORY ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
LAW 75, 98–99 (N.Y., Columbia Univ. 2d ed. 1897).
68. See Act of July 31, 1789 § 5, 1 Stat. at 43.
69. Even the term “regulation” tended to refer to statutes. See infra note 120.
70. See Act of July 31, 1789 §§ 1–40, 1 Stat. at 29–49.
71. See PAUL LEICESTER FORD, A LIST OF TREASURY REPORTS AND CIRCULARS ISSUED
BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1789–1795, at 3–4 (Brooklyn 1886) (listing several circulars that
Alexander Hamilton sent within a month of his confirmation). Alexander Hamilton’s
appointment was confirmed on September 11, 1789. RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, AMERICAN 80 (2011).
72. For a reprinting of one so titled, see BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S.
TREASURY DEP’T, THE WORK AND JURISDICTION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE 9
(1948).
73. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, 1 Stat. 279.
74. Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 280.
75. See generally FORD, supra note 71.
76. Professors Jerry Mashaw and Avi Perry agree with this evaluation. Jerry L. Mashaw &
Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the Antebellum Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 7, 14.
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and business ability with regard to the direction of office methods and
details of the administration, and [to] please himself as to the forms of
77
most of the documents . . . required to pass through his hands.”
The first explicit authorization for Treasury to issue guidance
called “regulations” was hedged with qualifications. Congress
reorganized the country’s tariff administration in the Tariff Act of
78
79
1832, a lesser known aspect of the great Nullification Crisis. The
language in the Tariff Act of 1832 is notable for its caution. First,
although the grant of authority allowed the Secretary to “establish
such rules and regulations . . . as the President of the United States
shall think proper,” that authority could not be exercised in a manner
80
“inconsistent with the laws of the United States.” Second, the grant
of authority was not just to the Secretary alone but was to “the
81
Secretary of the Treasury, under the direction of the President.”
Third, along with the authority to establish “rules and regulations,”
Congress imposed the “duty . . . to report all such rules and
regulations, with the reasons therefor, to the then next session of
82
Congress.”
It was not immediately clear what the Tariff Act of 1832 added
to the Secretary’s authority to issue tax guidance. Both before and
after its adoption, when there arose questions about the
implementation of the tariff laws, collectors would write to the

77. Goss, supra note 67, at 102.
78. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, 4 Stat. 583.
79. For the standard description of the Nullification Crisis, see REBECCA BROOKS
GRUVER, AN AMERICAN HISTORY 353–54, 372–77 (1972). The Tariff Act of 1832 was set to
take effect in March 1833. Act of July 14 § 2, 4 Stat. at 583. Its substantive provisions, however,
never went into effect because of blowback from various states. See WILLIAM MCKINLEY, THE
TARIFF IN THE DAYS OF HENRY CLAY AND SINCE: AN EXHAUSTIVE REVIEW OF OUR TARIFF
LEGISLATION FROM 1812 TO 1896, at 1–11 (N.Y., Henry Clay Publ’g Co. 1896); F.W. TAUSSIG,
THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 109–12 (8th ed. 1964). The Compromise Tariff
of March 2, 1833, was, officially, just a modification of the new administrative structure created
by the Tariff Act of 1832 (the official title of the Compromise Tariff was “[a]n Act to modify the
act of the fourteenth of July, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, and all other acts
imposing duties on imports”). See Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 629, 629. Thus, although
the substantive provisions of the Tariff Act of 1832 never went into effect, the administrative
provisions were carried forward, unchanged, into the Compromise Tariff. See Act of Aug. 30,
1842, ch. 270, § 26, 5 Stat. 548, 566; see also Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9 (1845) (discussing the
relationship between the Tariff Act of 1832 and the Tariff Act of 1842).
80. Act of July 14, 1832 § 9, 4 Stat. at 592.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Secretary and ask for his decision on the matter. The reply would
often take the form of a circular and thus grew the idea of a Treasury
84
“decision.” Why would collectors actually want, much less ask the
Secretary for, direction and supervision of their fiefdoms? The reason
is the oldest rule of bureaucracies: CYA. Collectors could raise the
Treasury Decisions as a liability shield against taxpayer suits.
85
Being sued by taxpayers came with the job of being a collector.
In theory, the official method for taxpayers to contest a tariff was to
give a bond for payment to the collector, then renege on the bond;
only then, when the collector sued on the bond, could the taxpayer
86
litigate the dispute. In practice, taxpayers early on convinced courts
that if they paid the collected tax they could file a common-law action
for assumpsit against the collector personally, because no suits would
87
lie against the sovereign United States. The Supreme Court

83. For example, in a Circular dated August 27, 1792, Alexander Hamilton gave his
decision on the “true construction” of the law to resolve a reported “difference of opinion
between the Collectors and Supervisors.” BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. TREASURY
DEP’T, THE WORK AND JURISDICTION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE 9 (1948).
84. For an example of collector–Secretary dialogue, see Professor Mashaw’s discussion of
Treasury Secretary Albert Gallitan’s use of circulars to administer the Embargo of 1807. See
Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 2, at 1668 (“The Treasury Department was also in
daily correspondence with the collectors. Specific questions regarding permits, detentions, and
interpretations of the embargo laws were sent to Gallatin, who responded with binding advisory
letters . . . .”).
85. For example, in the three-year period during which Jesse Hoyt was the collector for the
Port of New York, from 1838 until 1841, see Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 109, 132
(1850), he was sued multiple times. E.g., Hardy v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 292 (1839); Bend v.
Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263 (1839); Hughes v. Hoyt, 12 F. Cas. 836 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1839) (No.
6846); Dorr v. Hoyt, 7 F. Cas. 926 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No. 4007); Hadden v. Hoyt, 11 F. Cas.
147 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No. 5891); Hall v. Hoyt, 11 F. Cas. 226 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No.
5934).
86. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 627, 676–77 (outlining the procedures for
initiating a suit for the nonpayment of a bond and challenging the underlying assessment).
Taxpayers could also find a friendly congressman and get relief in a private bill. See Richard H.
Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims Against the
Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 155, 175 (1998) (“Before the
middle of the nineteenth century, contract claims directly against the federal government were
barred by sovereign immunity and contract claims against federal officers would not lie. Unable
to get relief in the courts, individuals with federal contract claims frequently petitioned
Congress for private bills as an alternative.”).
87. See William T. Plumb, Jr., Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60
HARV. L. REV. 685, 685–88 (1947). Because taxpayers tended to sue in state courts, Congress
passed the Force Act in 1833 that not only gave federal courts jurisdiction over such actions
regardless of diversity of citizenship but also allowed collectors to remove state-filed cases to
federal court. Force Act of 1833, ch. 57, §§ 2–3, 4 Stat. 632, 633–34. Otherwise, federal courts
would not have had subject-matter jurisdiction when the taxpayer and the collector were from
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approved this practice in 1836, so long as taxpayers paid under
explicit protest and permitted the collector to hold back the money
88
from Treasury in anticipation of the personal suit. The problem of
collectors holding back money, however, quickly became so great that
Congress created a statutory duty to turn over the money to
89
Treasury.
Collectors embraced the concept of Treasury guidance when
they could use it as a shield in litigation. For example, Tracy v.
90
Swartwout involved a dispute about a bond. F.A. Tracy and other
merchants landed casks of syrup and tendered a bond of 15 percent of
91
the value of the cargo to secure their promise to pay the import duty.
The Collector of the Port of New York, Samuel Swartwout, refused
to accept the bond, “acting under the instructions of the Secretary of
92
the Treasury.” His instructions from Treasury required him to
demand a much larger bond because there was doubt as to whether
the syrup was supposed to be taxed by its value or by its weight (three
93
cents per pound). Tracy and the merchants refused to provide a
larger bond, and the syrup sat deteriorating in storage for over

the same state; modern federal-question jurisdiction was not available until 1875. Judiciary Act
of 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1–2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)).
88. Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 154–55 (1836).
89. After Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836), collectors started holding back
in earnest to protect themselves from suit and, for some, to enrich themselves personally. See
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 243 (1845) (“It is matter of history that the alleged right to
retain . . . had led to great abuses, and to much loss to the public; and it is to these two subjects,
therefore, that the [1839] act of Congress particularly addresses itself.”). Money held back was
money not getting to Treasury. Congress quickly revised tax procedure to require collectors to
pay all collections to Treasury, even those made under protest and threat of suit. Act of Mar. 3,
1839, ch. 82, § 2, 5 Stat. 339, 348. At the same time, Congress authorized the Secretary to refund
improperly collected money to taxpayers, but only when the taxpayers could show actual
overpayment. Id., 5 Stat. at 348–49. Congress also created a statutory refund action, still
nominally against the collector. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727, 727. Eventually, the
Supreme Court recognized that action for what is really was, an action against the United
States. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1915) (“The
objection to the jurisdiction pressed by the Government is that the only remedy is a suit against
the Collector. . . . However gradually the result may have been approached in the earlier cases it
now has become accepted law that claims like the present are founded upon the revenue law.”
(quotation marks omitted)). For full discussion of this transformation, see generally Plumb,
supra note 87.
90. Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836).
91. Id. at 93. Apparently, Mr. Swartwout was something of a scoundrel in his own right. See
Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy,” supra note 2, at 1686.
92. Tracy, 35 U.S. at 93.
93. Id.
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94

eighteen months. Eventually, Swartwout received instructions to
95
take the 15 percent bond. Tracy and the other merchants sued to
96
recover for the damages for the lost syrup.
Swartwout trotted out the Treasury instructions to raise the
97
classic “just following orders” defense. This worked well for him at
the trial level. The court incorporated it into the jury instructions and,
as a result, although the jury returned a verdict of nominal damages
for the merchant (six cents), Swartwout escaped having to pay either
98
compensatory or exemplary damages to the merchants.
The defense worked somewhat less well at the Supreme Court.
The good news for Swartwout was the Court’s conclusion that a goodfaith reliance on Treasury instructions would protect him from
99
exemplary damages.
The bad news, however, was the Court’s conclusion that the
100
instructions could not shield him from compensatory damages. This
was because “[t]he secretary of the treasury is bound by the law; and
although in the exercise of his discretion he may adopt necessary
forms and modes of giving effect to the law . . . , neither he nor those
101
who act under him, can dispense with, or alter any of its provisions.”
The resulting liability did not trouble the Court because it believed
102
that Swartwout would be indemnified by the federal government.
And indeed, per opinions of the Attorneys General over the years,
there is evidence that indemnification of judgments was allowed out
103
of general appropriations.
The Court’s reasoning in Tracy was that the administrative
agency had the power to issue its own guidance—of course—as part

94. Id. at 82.
95. See id. at 93.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 82, 88.
98. Id. at 94.
99. Id. at 95.
100. Id. at 97, 99.
101. Id. at 95.
102. Id. at 98–99.
103. See Sec’y of the Navy To Satisfy a Judgment Against Commodore Elliott, 3 Op. Att’y
Gen. 306, 306 (1838) (authorizing indemnification of a particular naval officer from general
appropriations); see also Fees of Dist. Attorneys, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 146, 148 (1858) (“When a
ministerial or executive officer is sued for an act done in the lawful discharge of his duty, the
government which employed him is bound, in conscience and honor, to stand between him and
the consequences. It will not suffer any personal detriment to come upon him for his fidelity, but
will adopt his act as its own . . . .”).
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of its job in carrying out the will of Congress, whether set out in
circulars or letters or other documents. The Court gave no citation to
statutory authority for none was needed. This guidance was either
within the scope of the statutory law or outside its scope. Being
outside the scope of the statute, however, did not make the guidance
per se unlawful, for Swartwout was still bound to follow the guidance
because it came from his supervisor. In other words, orders from
above—even orders issued improperly or without authority—were
binding on the collector.
One sees this same conceptualization in Justice Woodbury’s
104
opinion for the Court twelve years later in Greely v. Thompson.
The case involved iron imported from Wales that was to be assessed
105
based on the iron’s value at the port of origin. In the time between
106
purchase and loading, the price of iron had risen by one-fifth. The
issue was whether Congress had required valuation to be the fair
market value at the time of purchase or the fair market value at the
107
time of loading. The statute was silent. Treasury had issued
108
guidance to fill this statutory gap: it instructed appraisers to value
109
cargo as of the date it was loaded onto the ship.
The Court, hewing to the traditional notion that courts say what
the law is, made two points about Treasury guidance, however
denominated. First, as to statutory interpretation, the Court
explained:
[The views] expressed in either letters or circulars, are entitled to
much respect, and will always be duly weighed by this court; but it is
the laws which are to govern, rather than their opinions of them, and
importers, in cases of doubt, are entitled to have their right settled

104. Greely v. Thompson, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 225 (1850). That Justice Woodbury voiced the
opinion of the Court is noteworthy because he had served six years as Treasury Secretary under
Presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. CHARLES LEVI WOODBURY, MEMOIR OF
HON. LEVI WOODBURY, LL.D. 5–6 (Bos., David Clapp & Son 1894). That, plus the fact that
Chief Justice Roger Taney, too, had run Treasury, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A CHRONOLOGY: 1646–1992, at 26 (1993),
suggests that the Court was operating with some significant firsthand input on the
administrative realities of the work done by Treasury.
105. Greely, 51 U.S. at 234–35.
106. Id. at 235.
107. Id. at 235–36 (citing Act of Mar. 1, 1823, ch. 21, § 5, 3 Stat. 729, 732).
108. Id. at 236.
109. Id.
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by the judicial exposition of those laws, rather than by the views of
110
the Department.

The Court then flat out ignored the Treasury guidance and used the
typical tools of statutory construction to conclude that the proper
111
measure of fair market value was the time of purchase, not loading.
The Court’s second point, however, ameliorated the first. That is,
the Court recognized that though the Treasury guidance was just an
interpretation, it was an interpretation that would bind Treasury
112
employees. The Court distinguished between the relationship of
Treasury guidance to employees, on the one hand, and to taxpayers,
on the other, noting that “as between the custom-house officers and
the Department, the latter must by law control the course of
proceeding, yet, as between them and the importer, it is well settled,
that the legality of all their doings may be revised in the judicial
113
tribunals.”
The 1850 Greely decision reflected not only the ideas in Tracy
but also the intervening statutory developments. By 1842, the grant of
authority to the Secretary to issue rules and regulations appeared
problematic, so Congress added a “we really mean it” statute. The
problem was that collectors would only follow Treasury Decisions
when doing so helped protect them from liability; they ignored those
Treasury Decisions that exposed them to greater liability. For
example, after Tracy v. Swartwout allowed taxpayers to sue collectors
if taxes were paid under protest, collectors became increasingly
reluctant to turn over taxes to the government and repeatedly ignored
114
instructions to do so. Even when collectors were willing to deposit
monies in government accounts, it was unclear exactly where the
government accounts were because of the collapse of the Second
115
Bank of the United States. Treasury issued directives dealing with
110. Id. at 234.
111. Id. at 235–36.
112. Id. at 234.
113. Id.
114. One prominent example was Jesse Hoyt, the collector of the Port of New York, who
refused to follow Treasury orders on how, where, and when to pay over the collected tariffs. See
Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 109, 136–43 (1850). Hoyt had received a Treasury
circular dated March 13, 1839, and had refused to follow its instructions, allegedly out of
concern that he would not be indemnified if sued by unhappy taxpayers. Id. at 111–12. He just
traded one suit for another. The government ended up suing him for over $200,000 in allegedly
missing money. Id. at 138–39.
115. See Mashaw & Perry, supra note 76, at 24–25 (describing President Andrew Jackson’s
ultimately successful attempt to transfer funds out of the Second Bank of the United States).
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both of these problems, but many collectors balked at obeying
116
them.
The “we really mean it” statute that Congress added in the Tariff
117
Act of 1842 placed collectors under an explicit statutory duty to
“execute and carry into effect all instructions of the Secretary of the
118
Treasury relative to the execution of the revenue laws.” It also
explicitly gave the Secretary authority to interpret the law: “[I]n case
any difficulty shall arise as to the true construction or meaning of any
part of such revenue laws, the decision of the Secretary of the
Treasury shall be conclusive and binding upon all such collectors and
119
other officers of the customs.”
The Tariff Act of 1842 reinforced two important concepts about
administrative regulation of the tax system. First, Treasury Decisions,
issued under the general authority to regulate, were the approved
modality for interpretation of the statutes. The idea was that Treasury
had the power to interpret and that the form of the interpretation
120
would be “the decision” of the Secretary.
Second, tax guidance was inward-looking, in that it was directed
at the actions of Treasury employees and not at the actions of
taxpayers. Specifically, Treasury Decisions regulated Treasury
employees’ actions in administering the tariff laws, and not the
actions of the taxpayers who were subject to tariff. That is, if a
taxpayer wanted to import iron from Wales, nothing in the Treasury
regulations could prohibit the ability to import or not to import.
Although tax guidance might affect the cost of importation, taxing
iron imports was qualitatively different than prohibiting them. In
contrast, section 28 of the same Tariff Act of 1842 flat out prohibited
“the importation of all indecent and obscene prints, paintings,

116. See supra note 89.
117. Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 24, 5 Stat. 548.
118. Id. § 24, 5 Stat. at 566.
119. Id.
120. One caution here. In the nineteenth century, the term “regulations” often referred to
statutes more than to administrative guidance. For example, the authority of Treasury
“regulations” administering the Tariff Act of 1842 was at issue in Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 9 (1845). A central dispute in the case was the meaning of the statutory phrase from
the Compromise Tariff, “regulations . . . prescribed by law.” Id. at 10, 13 (citing Act of Mar. 2,
1833, ch. 55, § 3, 4 Stat. 629, 630). In Justice Taney’s opinion, “the most important regulations in
relation to this part of the case are contained in the 7th, 8th and 9th sections of the act of July
14, 1832.” Id. at 28. Justice Taney reasoned that these sections survived the Tariff Act of 1842.
Id. He then used the ninth section’s authorization for the Secretary to issue rules and regulations
to hold that the Treasury instructions issued under the Tariff Act of 1832 also survived. Id. at 29.
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This prohibition
lithographs, engravings, and transparencies.”
regulated the actions of the taxpayers themselves, and directly
122
affected their ability to import certain items. Guidance issued
relative to that subject would be both inward-looking (because it
would regulate Treasury employees) and outward-looking (because it
would either allow or disallow specific taxpayer acts).
III. TAX GUIDANCE FROM 1862 TO THE APA
123

Forget 1913. The watershed year for the history of internal
taxation in the United States was 1862. That was when, in desperate
need of revenue to fund the Civil War, Congress passed a revenue act
124
125
of unprecedented scope and complexity. The Revenue Act of 1862
did not just toy with tariffs. It created a vast number of new internal
taxes. These internal revenue taxes were paid not only by those who
126
produced distilled spirits, but also by those who needed licenses and
who produced myriad articles of commerce, everything from candles
127
to cloth to pickles. Birthed along with this welter of new excise taxes
128
was a new kind of tax called the income duty. It was just the runt of
this litter; private compilations of the tax laws published over the next
129
several years did not even have “income” in their titles. Few
foresaw how big that runt would grow.
121. Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 548, 566.
122. See Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 2, at 1647–50 (discussing Treasury’s
implementation of the Embargo of 1807, in which both the law and the implementing rules
affected the ability to import).
123. Underwood Tariff Act, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913).
124. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432. As one commentator put it: “The Civil War
revolutionized the financial methods of the United States.” TAUSSIG, supra note 79, at 155.
Actually, 1862 was Congress’s second try. The act it passed the previous year, Act of Aug. 5,
1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292, had so many problems that it never went into effect. See EDWIN R. A.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF
INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 435–36 (2d ed. 1914).
125. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432.
126. See id. § 39, 12 Stat. at 446–47 (giving collectors authority over licenses for distilling).
127. See id. § 75, 12 Stat. at 462–66 (listing articles of manufacture subject to taxes “to be
paid by the producer or manufacturer thereof”). There were also excise taxes on auction sales,
id. § 76, 12 Stat. at 466, carriages, id. § 77, 12 Stat. at 467, railroads and other common carriers,
id. § 80, 12 Stat. at 468, and banks, id. § 82, 12 Stat. at 470. Two years later Congress even added
a proto-VAT tax on the manufacture of furniture. Act of June 30, 1864 § 174, 13 Stat. at 267.
128. Id. §§ 89–93, 12 Stat. at 473–75.
129. See generally GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1863); CHARLES N. EMERSON,
EMERSON’S INTERNAL REVENUE GUIDE, 1867 (Springfield, Mass., Samuel Bowles & Co. 1867);
CHARLES F. ESTEE, THE EXCISE TAX LAW (N.Y., Fitch, Estee & Co. 1863).

CAMP FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

TAX REGULATION PRIOR TO THE APA

4/21/2014 9:10 AM

1695

To administer these myriad new internal taxes Congress created
a new nationwide tax-administration structure, following the pattern
of the prior tariff acts. The Revenue Act of 1862 divided up the
nation into administrative districts and authorized the President to
appoint a collector of internal revenue for each district—analogous to
the collector of customs appointed for each port of entry—who in
130
turn was authorized to hire assistants. It also created in each district
131
the position of assessor, whose duty was to evaluate each taxpayer’s
liability by reviewing each “list or return,” and on that basis assess
132
taxes and give the resulting list to the collectors who then collected
133
the tax. In this way, Congress separated the tax-determination
function from the tax-collection function, a separation that remains a
fundamental aspect of tax administration to this day and is part of
what makes tax administration different from other regulatory
134
regimes.

130. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 2–5, 12 Stat. 432, 433–34; see also SELIGMAN, supra note
124, at 435–40 (describing actual operation of the Revenue Act of 1862).
131. Act of July 1, 1862 § 2, 12 Stat. at 433.
132. Id. §§ 6–7, 12 Stat. at 434–35.
133. Id. § 16, 12 Stat. at 437–38. The statutes use the terms “list” and “return”
interchangeably when discussing the document to be prepared by the taxpayer and given to the
government. For clarity, I refer to all such documents as “returns” and reserve the term “list”
for documents prepared by government employees.
134. See generally Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the
Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1
(2004) (explaining the difference and analyzing how the inquisitorial nature of both the tax
determination and tax collection processes is in tension with traditional notions of adversarial
justice) [hereinafter Camp, Tax Administration]; Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax
Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227 (2009) (showing how the tax-determination function and
tax-collection function have become depersonalized since World War II) [hereinafter Camp,
Theory and Practice]. As I have written elsewhere: “This idea of tax determination as separate
from the tax collection was thus built into the structure of the agency at its inception.” Camp,
Theory and Practice, supra, at 231 n.16. One sees this in one of Commissioner George
Boutwell’s earliest rulings, “that ‘no Revenue Agent or Inspector, Assessor or Assistant
Assessor, possesses any authority of law to receive money or checks in payment of
taxes . . . . Nor have Revenue Agents, Inspectors, Collectors, or Deputy Collectors any authority
of law to estimate or fix the amount of tax due from any individual.’” Id. (quoting Treasury
Circular 22, reprinted in EMERSON, supra note 129, at 13 n.†); see also Review, INTERNAL
REVENUE REC. & CUSTOMS J., Mar. 3, 1866, at 73 (quoting the same language). The division of
functions remains an important concept today. For example, I.R.C. § 7433 gives taxpayers a
statutory cause of action for damages caused by wrongful collection. I.R.C. § 7433(a) (2012).
Courts routinely limit this provision to the post-assessment phase of tax administration. See, e.g.,
Shaw v. United States, 20 F.3d 182 (1994) (“In this case, although the IRS improperly assessed
tax liability against Mrs. Shaw, it did not engage in improper collection procedures. Thus, Mrs.
Shaw cannot collect damages under § 7433.” (footnote omitted)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 822518, at 15–16 (1953) (explaining the division of function).
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Along with a hugely expanded set of taxes and a national
structure for their collection, Congress also created a new agency to
supervise the collectors and assessors. Officially denominated the
office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Congress placed it
135
as a subordinate office within Treasury. Within a few years, the
office became widely known as the Bureau of Internal Revenue
136
(BIR), and eventually, in 1954, it was renamed the Internal
137
Revenue Service.
On July 17, 1862, the BIR’s first Commissioner, the redoubtable
138
George S. Boutwell, took office. Boutwell wasted little time
ramping up operations. He started with just three clerks in July
139
1862, but by the end of 1862 he was supervising 3,882 employees
140
with all but sixty scattered throughout the non-rebelling states. As
these numbers suggest, tax administration was in large part a field
operation involving what one congressman denounced as an “army”
141
of tax collectors. That army needed guidance.
To meet that need, Congress gave general authority to the
Commissioner to make “all the instructions, regulations, directions,
forms, blanks, stamps, and licenses . . . which may be necessary to
142
carry this act into effect.” Unlike the cautious language Congress
135. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432, 432.
136. See BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, supra note 72, at 3–4 (suggesting reasons for the
name change).
137. The 1954 name change resulted from a wholesale reorganization of the BIR in the
wake of corruptions scandals. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 104, at 159. A good
contemporary description of the changes can be found in HUGH C. BICKFORD, SUCCESSFUL
TAX PRACTICE 183–202 (3d. ed. 1956). For a very nice history of various reforms in tax
administration, see generally Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A
Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717 (2001).
138. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 104, at 33.
139. BOUTWELL, supra note 129, at v.
140. Letter from George S. Boutwell, Comm’r of Internal Revenue, to S.P. Chase, Sec’y of
the Treasury (Jan. 13, 1863), reprinted in ESTEE, supra note 129, at 309–10. After the income tax
was allowed to expire in 1872, the number of personnel dropped considerably. See Camp,
Theory and Practice, supra note 134, at 236.
141. During the debates over creating the system, Representative Roscoe Conkling of New
York reflected the common view that “one of the most obnoxious—perhaps the most
obnoxious—of all it features is that which creates an army of officers whose business it is to
collect these taxes.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1861) (statement of Rep.
Conkling).
142. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432, 432–33. Later acts also contained “cleanup” authority for the Commissioner and the Secretary. For example, section 174 of the Revenue
Act of 1864 authorized the Commissioner, supervised by the Secretary, “to make all such
regulations, not otherwise provided for, as may become necessary by reason of the alternation
of the laws in relation to internal revenue, by virtue of this act.” Act of June 30, 1864, ch.
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used when it gave the Secretary authority to regulate tariff
administration, this general authority for the Commissioner to
regulate internal taxes was hedged only by the qualification that the
power be performed “under the direction of the Secretary of the
143
Treasury.”
In addition to the general grant of regulatory authority, which
was carried over from revenue act to revenue act, the early internal
revenue acts contained a multiplicity of specific grants of authority.
By my count, there were at least forty-three separate additional grants
of authority to perform specific regulatory actions in the Revenue Act
of 1864, twenty of which gave authority solely to the Commissioner,
fourteen of which gave authority solely to the Secretary, and nine of
which gave authority to the Commissioner but required approval by
144
the Secretary.
173, § 174, 13 Stat. 223, 304. A subsequent section authorized the Secretary, in turn, to make
regulations to collect any tax imposed by statute where “the mode or time of assessment or
collection is not therein provided.” Id. § 176, 13 Stat. at 305.
143. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432, 432–33
144. The provisions granting authority solely to the Commissioner included: Act of June 30,
1864 § 8, 13 Stat. at 224 (rules for dividing assessment districts); id. § 29, 13 Stat. at 234 (rules for
sale of seized property); id. § 59, 13 Stat. at 244 (rules for marking the quantity and proof of
liquor); id. § 61, 13 Stat. at 245 (rules for accounting for leakages during transportation of
liquor); id. § 82, 13 Stat. at 258 (rules for the form and detail of declarations of sales or deliveries
by certain manufacturers); id. § 84, 13 Stat. at 259 (rules for sale of seized goods); id. § 94, 13
Stat. at 265 (broad discretion to write rules applying the statutes written for distillers of spirits to
distillers of, among other things, coal-oil and naphtha); id. § 94, 13 Stat. at 269 (rules for returns,
assessment, and collection of duties on wines not made from grapes, currents, rhubarb, or
berries); id. § 102, 13 Stat. at 275 (rules for determining the number of slaughtered livestock
subject to tax); id. § 109, 13 Stat. at 277 (rules for the form and manner of reporting returns
made by certain businesses); id. § 110, 13 Stat. at 278 (rules for the form and manner of
reporting returns made by banks); id. § 118, 13 Stat. at 282 (rules for the form and manner of
claiming an exemption from the duty to provide a return); id. § 118, 13 Stat. at 283 (rules for
form and manner for taxpayers to administratively appeal decisions of assistant assessors); id.
§ 122, 13 Stat. at 285 (rules for form and manner of income returns made by certain businesses);
id. § 125, 13 Stat. at 286 (rules for form and manner of estate tax returns made by executors); id.
§ 143, 13 Stat. at 290 (very broad discretion to mash up the various classes of estate taxes “as he
shall think fit,” discharge all successors when the mashed-up tax so determined, and extend time
for payment “in special cases in which he may think it expedient so to do”); id. § 157, 13 Stat. at
293 (broad discretion to create rules for cancelling stamps “as substitute for, or in addition to,
the method now prescribed by law, as he may deem expedient and effectual”); id. § 161, 13 Stat.
at 294–95 (rules for the allowance of spoiled stamps); id. § 162, 13 Stat. at 295 (rules governing
how taxpayers may obtain guidance on whether or not a particular instrument is subject to any
stamp duty); id. § 170, 13 Stat. at 298 (rules for issuance and distribution of stamps prepayment).
The provisions giving authority solely to the Secretary included: id. § 2, 13 Stat. at 223
(rules governing the Commissioner’s keeping and paying of accounts); id. § 3, 13 Stat. at 224
(rules prescribing Commissioner’s duties); id. § 9, 13 Stat. at 225 (rules governing the collectors'
keeping of accounts and paying taxes collected); id. § 44, 13 Stat. at 239–40 (rules regulating the
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The unprecedented scope of the new taxing statutes created an
unprecedented demand for guidance, and Boutwell was up for the
challenge. By his estimate, his office pumped out up to eight hundred
145
letters per day. His productivity came from his organizational skills:
Boutwell reported that he divided his personnel into subject-matter
areas and, as did Treasury, answered common questions with form
146
letters.
The combination of statutory authority granted to the
Commissioner and Boutwell’s disciplined responses thus created a
new level of guidance, unmediated by his boss, the Secretary. This
Commissioner-level guidance made its first public appearance in
Boutwell’s Manual of the Direct and Excise Tax System of the United
States, a remarkable compilation of tax guidance that Boutwell
published in April 1863, just after his short, eight-month stay in office.
The purpose of the compilation was “to furnish to the officers of the
revenue, to business men, and to members of the legal profession,
such authority and information for the transaction of business, as can
be derived from the proceedings, experience, and decisions of the

power of the Commissioner to return erroneously assessed collected funds); id. § 56, 13 Stat. at
243 (rules for the inspection and gauging of spirits); id. § 61, 13 Stat. at 245 (rules for obtaining
exception to excise tax by using bonded warehouses); id. § 90, 13 Stat. at 263 (rules for
transporting manufactured tobacco, snuff, or cigars to bonded warehouses); id. § 94, 13 Stat. at
265 (broad discretion to write rules applying the statutes written for assessment and collection
of duties on cotton to turpentine); id. § 97, 13 Stat. at 273 (rules on what qualifies as a federal
government purchase contract entered into before the effective date of the statute that would be
eligible for tax exemption); id. § 168, 13 Stat. at 296 (rules governing the manufacturing of
certain articles intended for export); id. § 170, 13 Stat. at 297–98 (rules governing distribution
and supply of materials to make stamps); id. § 171, 13 Stat. at 303 (general rules for how
taxpayers may use certificates of drawback in lieu of payment); id. § 176 13 Stat. at 305 (rules for
mode or time of assessment or collection of any tax if the mode or time of assessment is not in
the statute); id. § 177, 13 Stat. at 305 (rules for taxpayers to show previous payments of tax on
cotton).
The provisions giving authority to the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary
included: id. § 6, 13 Stat. at 224 (rules for the duties of subordinates); id. § 9, 13 Stat. at 225
(rules setting the amount of bonds which collectors were required to provide before assuming
office); id. § 11, 13 Stat. at 225 (rules for form of returns); id. § 33, 13 Stat. at 236 (rules for how
collectors were to make their deposits); id. § 46, 13 Stat. at 240 (rules for time and manner of
collection of taxes in re-conquered territories); id. § 84, 13 Stat. at 259 (rules for sale of forfeited
manufactured goods); id. § 117, 13 Stat. at 281–82 (rules for how to include and report certain
income earned by U.S. government employees); id. § 119, 13 Stat. at 283 (rules for form and
manner of warrants issued to seize property); id. § 171, 13 Stat. at 303 (rules for how taxpayers
may use certificates of drawbacks in lieu of payments of duties on cotton).
145. BOUTWELL, supra note 129, at v.
146. Id.
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147

Office of Internal Revenue.” After setting out the statutes then in
force, Boutwell then compiled all of the tax guidance issued to date,
including the then-familiar Treasury circulars, some Treasury
documents titled “regulations,” and some of Boutwell’s letters to
148
collectors and taxpayers, which he denominated “rulings.”
It is the set of rulings from Boutwell that are most remarkable.
They were different from any kind of guidance that had come before.
First, they were issued at a level of authority that was lower than the
149
President or Secretary. Second, the rulings were summaries of
various letters and, in some cases, the rulings simply used the exact
150
language used in the letters. In other cases, however, the rulings
modified or reversed the original letters to reflect the experience of
151
the office. As a consequence of these three features, Boutwell
cautioned that “the Rulings should not be regarded as binding upon
the Office of Internal Revenue, but rather as the opinions of the
152
editor of this volume.” This distinction between rules created by the
Commissioner and rules created by the Secretary has remained, and
similar language can still be found in the preface to every Internal
153
Revenue Bulletin today.

147. Id.; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 104, at 33, 35 (noting Boutwell’s
installation as Commissioner on July 17, 1862, and his resignation on March 4, 1863). Boutwell
published a follow-up volume in 1866 to codify the many changes Congress made in the tax
statutes in 1865 and 1866. See GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, Preface to THE TAX-PAYER’S MANUAL
(Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1866).
148. See generally BOUTWELL, supra note 129. The other contemporary compilations set out
some of the same documents but give them different names. What Boutwell called “Rulings,”
Charles Estee called “Decisions of the Commissioner” or sometimes “Regulations of the
Commissioner.” See, e.g., ESTEE, supra note 129, at 214, 270. By the time Estee printed his
compilation, the various instructions to field agents had been retitled as “Regulations” and had
numbers associated with them. See, e.g., id. at 270. In addition to those of Boutwell and Estee,
other private publications soon followed, many of which not only reproduced the statutes in
force, but also reprinted much of the guidance issued by the Commissioner. E.g., EMERSON,
supra note 129.
149. See BOUTWELL, supra note 129, at 300.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Here is the statement used in the very first Cumulative Bulletin issued in December
1919:
The Income Tax Rulings constitute a service of information from which taxpayers
and their counsel may obtain the best available indication of the trend and tendency
of official opinion in the administration of the income . . . provisions of the Revenue
Acts. The rulings have none of the force or effect of Treasury Decisions and do not
commit the Department to any interpretation of law which has not been formally
approved and promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury.
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These changes in the concept of administrative regulation, which
were created by the Civil War tax statutes, played out in both of the
problems addressed by this Article: the problem of authority and the
problem of issuance. I will consider each in turn.
A. The Problem of Authority
The case law that developed between the Civil War and the
enactment of the APA in 1946 did not draw a clear distinction
between the authority of tax guidance issued by the Secretary and this
new sub–Treasury guidance issued by the Commissioner without
approval by the Secretary. This subsection gives two examples of
ways in which courts addressed the issue of authority. First is a class
of civil cases involving distilleries. These cases draw a sharp
distinction between the legal effect of rules issued by the
Commissioner and rules issued by the Secretary. The second example
is a class of criminal cases that involve the oleomargarine tax. In these
cases, the level of approval was less important than the specificity of
the grant of regulatory authority. This subsection concludes by
discussing authority problems caused by statutory change.
In a series of cases in the 1890s involving distilleries, courts
distinguished between Treasury guidance and sub–Treasury
154
guidance. During this period, Congress taxed the production of
155
alcohol, regardless of whether it was legal or illegal in any particular
156
state. In state prosecutions against illegal distilleries, state courts
demanded that collectors or their deputies turn over federal tax
157
records of the alleged illegal distilleries. When federal employees
refused, the employees were thrown in jail and had to file habeas
158
writs to be released. Just as the collector of customs in Tracy v.
159
Swartwout used Treasury instructions as a liability shield, so did the

1 C.B. i (1919). That language now reads: “Rulings and procedures reported in the Bulletin do
not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations, but they may be used as
precedents.” Introduction, 2014-11 I.R.B. 623.
154. See infra notes 161–65 and accompanying text.
155. E.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 55, 13 Stat. 223, 243.
156. The plain language of the taxing acts did not condition the tax on the legality of the
distilleries, thereby prompting this set of disputes. See generally In re Hirsch, 74 F. 928, 928
(C.C.D. Conn. 1896).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 929.
159. See Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 88 (1836); see supra notes 96–101 and
accompanying text.
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federal employees try to use instructions from their superiors as their
160
get-out-of-jail card.
The effectiveness of this “just following orders” defense turned
on the difference between Treasury guidance and sub–Treasury
guidance. In the early 1890s, only rulings and circulars from the
Commissioner instructed employees to withhold tax records from
state courts. That was not good enough for the courts to grant the
161
habeas writs. In In re Hirsch, the court conceded that “[r]egulations
made by the head of one of the departments of the government, in
pursuance of a statute authorizing them to be made, have the force of
162
law over those to be affected thereby.” The problem was that the
163
court could find no such regulations. Instead, it could only find
rulings of the Commissioner which it concluded were “not the
regulations in regard to the assessment of the internal revenue which
164
have the force of a statute.” The court viewed these rulings as
165
“instructions based upon the commissioner’s legal opinion.”
After In re Hirsch, Treasury incorporated the same instructions
166
into Regulations, Series 7, No. 12. After that, lower courts had no
167
difficulty granting habeas writs. Neither did the Supreme Court. In
168
Boske v. Comingore, Justice Harlan employed the following logic:
First, Congress had the power to make all laws “necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the powers vested by [the Constitution] in
the Government of the United States or in any Department or officer
160. In re Hirsch, 74 F. at 930–32.
161. In re Hirsch, 74 F. 928 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896).
162. Id. at 931. But see In re Huttman, 70 F. 699, 701–02 (D. Kan. 1895) (“[T]he
commissioner of internal revenue, with the approval of the secretary of the treasury, by statute
is given the power to make such regulations as he deems necessary in the matter of the
assessment and collection of internal revenue. . . . [S]uch regulations have the force of
statutes.”).
163. In re Hirsch, 74 F. at 931.
164. See id. at 932 (“This letter and others of like character . . . are not the regulations in
regard to the assessment of the internal revenue which have the force of a statute. They express
the views of an officer of the government . . . .”).
165. Id. A minority of courts disagreed with this analysis, with one court concluding that the
ruling “must be regarded by all as having the same force as an act of congress.” In re Huttman,
70 F. at 701.
166. T.D. 19,245, in 1 TREASURY DECISIONS UNDER TARIFF AND INTERNAL REVENUE
LAWS ETC. (D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1898). The amendments are reprinted in In re
Comingore, 96 F. 552, 559 (D. Ky. 1899), aff’d sub nom. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459
(1900).
167. See, e.g., In re Weeks, 82 F. 729, 731–32 (D. Vt. 1897). Perhaps this is the first example
of what Professor Lederman calls “fighting regs.” See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
168. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1890).
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169

thereof.” Second, that power “was exerted by Congress when it
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to [write] regulations not
170
inconsistent with law.” Third, the regulations at issue were not
171
Justice Harlan emphasized that the
“inconsistent with law.”
Secretary could not go “beyond the authority conferred upon him by
Congress,” and the evaluation of that issue was the same as the
evaluation “[that] controls when an act of Congress is assailed as not
172
being within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution.” In
other words, all regulations properly enacted should receive
heightened deference. In Harlan’s opinion, there was neither a
distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations, nor a
173
distinction between specific and general regulatory authority.
Instead, Justice Harlan focused on the level of authority.
Second, and in contrast to the distillery cases, are criminal cases
in which the government prosecuted taxpayers for violating the tax
laws on oleomargarine. In these cases, the difference between success
and failure of the regulatory effort was not the level of regulatory
authority; rather it was the specificity of the regulatory authority.
On August 2, 1886, Congress passed a statute imposing an excise
174
tax on the manufacture of oleomargarine. Section 6 of the statute
placed a duty on manufacturers to properly label their packages of
oleomargarine in a manner “as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
175
prescribe” and provided criminal penalties for violation of the duty.
This duty was typical language in internal revenue statutes that
176
imposed excise taxes. Other sections of the statute created other
177
duties and imposed criminal consequences for their violation, with

169. Id. at 469 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 468–70.
172. Id. at 470.
173. See generally id.
174. Oleomargarine Act of 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209. The statute was widely understood to
be a protectionist measure in favor of butter producers. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Public
Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L.
REV. 83, 126–29 (1989).
175. Oleomargarine Act of 1886 § 6, 24 Stat. at 210.
176. Cf., e.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 59, 13 Stat. 223, 244 (requiring distillers to
“mark upon the cask or other package containing such spirits, in a manner to be prescribed by
said commissioner, the quantity and proof of the contents of such cask”).
177. See, e.g., Oleomargarine Act of 1886 § 7, 24 Stat. at 210 (providing for a fine of $50 for
removing labels); id. § 15, 24 Stat. at 212 (providing for a fine of $100–$2,000 and a prison
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section 18 being a catchall provision that imposed a $1,000 penalty on
any taxpayer who failed to do “any of the things required by law in
178
the carrying on or conducting of . . . business.” In addition, section
20 gave general authority to the Commissioner, with approval by the
Secretary, to “make all needful regulations for the carrying into effect
179
of this act.”
Although the specific grant of authority to regulate in section 6
and the general grant of authority to regulate in section 20 both
required the same level of approval—that of the Secretary—it was the
difference in specificity and not the level of approval that determined
the success or failure of the government to prosecute a taxpayer for
violations of regulations under the act. This difference in specificity is
illustrated in the lower courts’ responses to the Supreme Court’s
180
decision in United States v. Eaton. In Eaton, the taxpayer was
indicted for violating section 18 by failing to keep certain records
181
required by Treasury Regulations. The regulations were issued
182
under the general authority of section 20. In response to a certified
question, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “required by law”
183
in section 18 did not include Treasury Regulations. The Court
reasoned that, although a regulation imposing a duty not contained in
the statute may well have the “force of law” for some purposes, “it
does not follow that a thing required by them is a thing so required by
184
law as to make the neglect to do the thing a criminal offence.”
Despite the result in Eaton, prosecutions of taxpayers for
violating marking regulations under section 6 succeeded. About one
week after Eaton was decided, a district court upheld an indictment
for violating regulations promulgated pursuant to section 6. In United
185
States v. Ford, the taxpayer was indicted for violating section 6
because he failed to mark containers of oleomargarine as required by
186
Treasury Regulations. The court distinguished Eaton by evaluating

sentence for removing revenue stamps); id. § 17, 24 Stat. at 212 (providing for, among other
things, a $500–$5,000 fine and a prison sentence for evading the tax).
178. Id. § 18, 24 Stat. at 212.
179. Id. § 20, 24 Stat. at 212.
180. United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892).
181. Id. at 678–79.
182. Id. at 686.
183. Id. at 688.
184. Id.
185. United States v. Ford, 50 F. 467 (E.D. Mo. 1892).
186. Id. at 467–68.
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the relationship between the marking regulations and the alleged
statutory violation:
The difficulty in the Eaton Case was that congress had not created
any such offense as that for which the defendant was indicted. The
commissioner had in fact assumed to amend the law. But in the case
at bar there is no such difficulty. The offense charged in the
indictment is one fully described in the sixth section of the act. The
marks and brands prescribed by the commissioner are such as he
was specially authorized to prescribe. In the case at bar, therefore,
the indictment states an offense against the laws of the United
States, unless the decision in U.S. v. Eaton is understood to mean
that no regulation of the commissioner of internal revenue can have
187
the force and effect of law.

Later courts, including the Supreme Court, consistently followed this
188
rationale in upholding other indictments for violations of section 6.
So here we have a tax regulation issued under a specific statute
that was sufficiently authoritative to support a criminal indictment.
But the reason was not because the regulation did anything novel.
The regulation did not impermissibly enlarge or modify or add to the
statute. It interpreted the statute; the courts consistently describe the
marking regulation as “a matter of executive detail in the
189
enforcement of this revenue act, rather than of legislative action.”
Filling in these details fell within the traditional interpretative
function of administrative rules and so “involved no unconstitutional
190
delegation of power.”
Another thorny authority problem for tax guidance of all kinds—
especially after Congress reinstated the income tax in 1913—was the
191
relationship between tax rules and statutory changes. Each new

187. Id. at 468–69.
188. See In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 533 (1897); Wilkins v. United States, 96 F. 837, 839–40
(3d Cir. 1899); Prather v. United States, 9 App. D.C. 82, 88–90 (D.C. Cir. 1896).
189. Wilkins, 96 F. at 839; see also In re Kollock, 165 U.S. at 533 (noting that the regulation
was a “mere matter of detail”).
190. In re Kollock, 165 U.S. at 537. Thus, here, I respectfully part company with Professors
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts, who believe that “[b]y specifically providing for the
imposition of sanctions for the violation of a given regulation, Congress resolved any question
of authority and also sent an unambiguous signal of its intent that the resulting rules have the
force of law.” Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 499 (2002).
191. See Carlton Fox, Preface to 127 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
1909–1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 1, 3–6
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revenue act had to be correlated with prior law, yet the acts
themselves were inconsistent: some repealed all provisions of prior
acts and substituted new ones, others repealed only parts of prior
192
acts, and still others had no clear directions either way. In response
to this problem, an office in the BIR prepared new regulations,
sometimes with new numbers and sometimes with the same number,
193
for each new revenue act. For example, Regulations 33 were
published to guide taxpayers and BIR personnel on the subject of
194
income taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1913. But there was a
195
separate Regulations 33 for the Revenue Act of 1916. To cover the
period between the new revenue act’s effective date and the new
regulations, the “decision” of the Secretary was that “income-tax
regulations in force . . . are hereby extended and made applicable to
the act of September 8, 1916, so far as not inconsistent with the
196
provisions of that statute.”
An additional question raised by the frequent statutory changes
in tax laws was what authority regulations continued to have once the
laws had changed, even when part of the particular subject of
guidance had been cut and pasted from one statute into the next. This
problem was exacerbated by the difficulties in creating a meaningful
federal codification of the laws. The Revised Statutes of the 1870s had
proved a failure, and efforts to recodify all federal statutes did not
gain traction until well after World War I, with the U.S. Code first
197
entering into force in 1925. It is not surprising, then, that the

(Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) (explaining, in brief, the evolution of tax regulations from
1863 to 1936).
192. Generally, up until the revenue laws were once again consolidated into the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, each revenue law contained an extension provision like section 1100 of
the Revenue Act of 1926: “All administrative, special, or stamp provisions of law, including the
law relating to the assessment of taxes, so far as applicable, are hereby extended to and made a
part of this Act.” Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1100, 44 Stat. 9, 111.
193. 1 ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MONOGRAPH NO. 22, ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS: BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, BOARD OF TAX APPEALS, PROCESSING TAX BOARD OF REVIEW 144
(1940).
194. Regulations 33, T.D. 1944, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 27 (1914).
195. Regulations 33 (rev.), T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 126 (1918).
196. T.D. 2367, 18 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 168, 168 (1916).
197. See Roy G. Fitzgerald, 1 U.S.C. preface (1926). For a more detailed history of this
process, and for an example of the complexity this created with respect to just one issue of tax
administration, see Camp, Tax Administration, supra note 134, at 36–51.
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authority of Treasury Regulations was sometimes overtaken by
198
statutory events, and yet no one would notice for decades.
B. The Problem of Issuance
Perhaps the most important consequence arising from the
volume and complexity of administrative guidance issued as a result
of the Civil War tax statutes was the need to convey guidance to both
internal and external stakeholders. The new tax statutes imposed a
new set of duties on citizens and, as today, required an understanding
of those duties and cooperation in making the proper reports and
paying the proper tax. Commissioner Boutwell and later
Commissioners thus found themselves responding to questions from
199
taxpayers as well as collectors and assessors. Thus arose the
problem of how to issue guidance in a timely and transparent manner.
Though the various collectors received guidance in the forms of
circulars, serials, and Treasury Decisions, I have not discovered any
official mechanism for distribution of the same guidance to the public
at large before the 1890s. Rather, private publications collected both
statutes and administrative rulings together and were published for
200
both “subordinate revenue officers and the public.”
After the Civil War, Treasury began issuing weekly editions of its
Treasury Decisions, and in 1899 began publishing yearly volumes that
201
cumulated the weekly editions. It appears that every type of
guidance issued was labeled as a Treasury Decision, whether it was
what we would now distinguish as a regulation, a revenue ruling, a

198. See Camp, Tax Administration, supra note 134, at 48, 50 n.253 (recounting the story of
Rasquin v. Muccini, 72 F.2d 688, 689–90 (2d Cir. 1934), in which the enforcement of a summons
was denied when a Treasury Regulation was based on a codified statute that had lapsed).
199. Typical of these is Commissioner N.B. Scott’s response to a letter from one taxpayer, a
Frank H. Platt, disputing the Commissioner’s interpretation of the revenue laws and suggesting
“that the matter be immediately submitted by you to the United States attorney, with a view to
having the question submitted to the United States court on an agreed statement of facts.” T.D.
20,459, 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 7 (1898). To this Scott replied: “[T]he internal-revenue tax is not
collected through the courts . . . . The courts can be appealed to after the Commissioner’s
decisions have been complied with, and not before.” Id. at 7–8.
200. EMERSON, supra note 129, at iii; see also ESTEE, supra note 129, at iii (“The compiler
has endeavored to prepare a volume valuable to every officer of the law, also to every lawyer,
merchant, manufacturer, and tax payer . . . .”).
201. The decision to publish the first cumulative volume, which contained “decisions extant
December 31, 1898,” was made in response to “the great demand . . . upon the Department for
copies of these [weekly] decisions.” 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 5, 5 (1899). The first cumulative
volume was so popular that a second was published the following year. See 2 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 5, 5 (1900).
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private letter ruling, or just a report of a court case important to tax
administration. Moreover, every type of guidance issued was labeled
as a Treasury Decision irrespective of whether it was issued by the
Commissioner alone or the Commissioner acting with approval from
202
the Secretary.
Beginning in 1919, the government gave income-tax guidance its
own publication, published in a weekly Bulletin and compiled into
203
twice-yearly Cumulative Bulletins. The nomenclature also changed.
Tax guidance issued at the Treasury level was still labeled a Treasury
Decision and was still published in the yearly volumes of Treasury
Decisions, but sub–Treasury guidance documents were no longer
labeled Treasury Decisions nor published in those yearly volumes.
Instead, both Treasury Decisions and all sub–Treasury guidance were
published in the Cumulative Bulletins, including rulings signed by the
Commissioner as well as lower-level guidance, such as legal opinions,
committee recommendations, and office (as opposed to Treasury)
204
decisions. This arrangement sometimes led to a Treasury Decision
205
being published in two places.
The frequency of statutory change also created problems for the
issuance of tax guidance. As regulations outlived their implementing
statute, they were revised into different regulations with different
206
numbers and were thus difficult to track. To fill the need for
correlating guidance with the appropriate statutes, private companies
202. See, e.g., T.D. 21,875, 2 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 315 (1899) (letter “[t]o collectors of
internal revenue and others” containing a list of drugs, the revenue from which was exempt
from tax, signed by the Commissioner and the Secretary); T.D. 21,814, 2 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev.
314 (1899) (letter “[t]o collectors of internal revenue and others” amending a regulation, signed
by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary); T.D. 20,952, 2 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 95
(1899) (letter “[t]o collectors and other officers of internal revenue” circulating a federal court
decision, signed by the Commissioner alone); T.D. 20,365, 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 27 (1898)
(letter to a firm ruling on whether proposed transactions were subject to bankers’ special-tax
liability, signed by the Commissioner alone); T.D. 19,739, 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 9 (1898) (letter
interpreting a provision of the war-revenue act as applied to cattle sales, signed by the
Commissioner alone).
203. 1 C.B. iii, iii, intro. (1919).
204. See, e.g., 3 C.B. 3, 3, preface (1920) (listing the various types of guidance documents
published in that edition).
205. For example, Treasury Decision 3037 was published in the Cumulative Bulletin, T.D.
3037, 3 C.B. 93 (1920), and with the yearly compilation of Treasury Decisions, T.D. 3037, 22
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 311 (1920). This duplication ceased in 1942 when, to conserve paper,
Treasury discontinued publishing the compilation of Treasury Decisions. See 36 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. iii, iii (1942).
206. For one example of the difficultly in tracing regulations from 1918 through 1926, see
generally Appeal of Blum’s, Inc., 7 B.T.A. 737 (1927).

CAMP FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1708

4/21/2014 9:10 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1673
207

created services that published multivolume serial sets. Treasury
also published periodic compilations of the internal revenue laws in
force as of a specific year, which contained heavily annotated
reproductions of the relevant statutes and attempted to relate the
208
various statutes to the relevant versions of the I.R.C.
C. The Impact of Regulatory Changes
These problems of issuance and authority led to three important
developments in tax administration in the period leading up to the
APA’s enactment: (1) the reenactment doctrine, (2) the retroactivity
doctrine, and (3) the emergence of the idea of legislative and
interpretative regulations.
First, the reenactment doctrine was the judicial work-around to
209
the problem of regulations being overtaken by statutory changes.
The doctrine was built on the idea that reenactment of statutory
provisions with unchanged, previously used statutory language,
represented an implicit approval of the prior administrative
210
construction of that language. Drawing from hints and suggestions
in late-nineteenth-century cases, the Supreme Court fully embraced
211
this idea by the late 1930s, and it became the subject of robust
212
The debate became particularly academic after
scholarly debate.
the creation of an amendable I.R.C. in 1939, because Congress no
longer had to reenact the entire body of tax statutes every time it
213
wanted to change some aspect of federal taxation.
This

207. See, e.g., [1947] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) iii (explaining that the Standard Federal
Tax Reporter “stems from the first loose leaf tax Reporter which was published in 1913 for the
express purpose of providing complete coverage of the first constitutional income tax law and
the developments under it”); cf. 4 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG. 405 (1926) (advertising special
cabinets designed to hold Tax Services).
208. See, e.g., BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, DOCUMENT NO.
2981, INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS IN FORCE APRIL 1, 1927 (1928).
209. For a summary of the history of the reenactment doctrine, see generally Norman J.
Hearn, Comment, Taxation: Effect of Re-Enactment of Revenue Statutes After Administrative
Interpretation, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 578 (1939).
210. See Griswold, supra note 41, at 400.
211. E.g., Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 116 (1939)
212. See Griswold, supra note 41, at 398 n.1 (listing just some of the articles contributing to
the debate).
213. Statutes before 1939 reenacted the entire set of tax provisions. See generally Revenue
Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648. Statutes after 1939 amended the Tax Code. See Revenue Act
of 1940, ch. 247, 53 Stat. 862; see also Feller, supra note 42, at 1314 (noting that “we may have
seen an end” to the periodic reenactment of the basic taxing statute).
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development in tax administrative law spread into other substantive
214
areas as well.
Second, the retroactivity doctrine was built on the idea that
Treasury Decisions interpreting the taxing statutes were “merely
declaring what the statute had meant all along, and therefore [were]
215
necessarily retroactive.” After all, as seen in Justice Harlan’s 1900
Boske opinion, Treasury Decisions were only as good as the authority
216
given by Congress to issue them. And the general authority to make
all “needful regulations” was a license neither to add substance to a
217
statute nor to interpret what was not there to be interpreted. But
insofar as Treasury Regulations were a proper exercise of authority,
this same theory that limited the rulemaking power in one respect
gave it enormous power in another respect: the regulations were
automatically retroactive and Treasury was powerless to do anything
218
about that. The harshness of this rule was felt most when Treasury
changed its regulations; the new regulation would then supersede the
old, not just on a going-forward basis but also for all cases.
Accordingly, and at Treasury’s request, Congress added a
219
provision to the Revenue Act of 1921 that gave Treasury the power
to change regulations and Treasury Decisions without retroactive
220
effect in what is now codified as I.R.C. § 7805(b). The presumption

214. See, e.g., Feller, supra note 42, at 1314 (“[T]here is still some question outside the tax
field as to whether reenactment should be considered an aid in determining the weight to be
given administrative constructions.”).
215. Wis. Nipple & Fabricating Corp. v. Comm’r, 581 F.2d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1978).
216. See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900).
217. Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1924). There, the statute imposed a
tax on “adulterated butter,” defining that as butter that contained “abnormal” amounts of
moisture. Id. at 319. Treasury Regulation No. 9, in turn, defined “abnormal” as any moisture
content greater than 16 percent. Id. The Court held that “[t]he regulation prescribes a standard
which Congress has not authorized the Commissioner or the Secretary to fix. It sets up a
definition of adulterated butter which conflicts with that contained in the act.” Id. at 321.
218. See Paul Gordon Hoffman, Comment, Limits on Retroactive Decision Making by the
Internal Revenue Service: Redefining Abuse of Discretion Under 7805(b), 23 UCLA L. REV. 529,
532 (1976) (noting that, prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1314, 42
Stat. 227, 314, the judicial position was that “[a]n incorrect [Treasury] interpretation [of a
statute] . . . did not alter the law’s meaning; only Congress could modify the law it had made,”
and “[s]ince an incorrect interpretation was therefore a nullity, a correct interpretation
necessarily operated retroactively to the date of adoption of the legislation”).
219. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
220. Id. § 1314, 42 Stat. at 314 (current version at I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012)). The path from
the 1921 language to the current language in § 7805(b) goes something like this: The original
statute gave the discretion to not make regulations retroactive. Id. That discretion was extended
in 1928 to cover new regulations, Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 605, 45 Stat. 791, 874, and in
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of retroactivity remained, however, because Treasury Regulations
were simply declarative, or interpretive, of the law. If Treasury did
not exercise its discretion to make its Treasury Decisions operate
prospectively, taxpayers bore a heavy burden to convince a court that
221
Treasury had abused its discretion.
The 1921 discretion to make regulations prospective was given to
222
all three classes of regulatory guidance discussed above: it extended
the discretion to any “regulation or Treasury decision relating to the
internal revenue laws made by the Commissioner or the Secretary, or
223
by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.” By
making no reference to any difference in the legal effect of
regulations issued pursuant to a specific grant of authority and those
issued pursuant to a general grant of authority, this statutory
language suggests that all regulations were interpretative; otherwise
there would be no need to permit their prospective application.
Third, there emerged the idea that tax regulations could be a
224
legitimate exercise of legislative authority. As of 1920, all legitimate
tax regulations were viewed as interpretative of the tax laws.
Regulations that went beyond interpretations were invalid exercises
of power precisely because they were legislative in character. The
tariff cases, distillery cases, and oleomargarine cases are all consistent

1934 to cover the Commissioner’s rulings as well, Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 506, 48 Stat.
680, 757. The 1934 modification also eliminated the prior all-or-nothing approach by authorizing
flexibility to determine “the extent, if any” to which regulations could not be retroactively
applied. See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 38 (1934) (noting the possibility for
“inequitable results” from retrospective application and thus the “desirab[ility]” of giving
Treasury “the power to avoid these results”).
221. See Bryan T. Camp, Note, The Retroactivity of Treasury Regulations: Paths to Finding
Abuse of Discretion, 7 VA. TAX REV. 509, 510–11 (1987). In 1996, Congress flipped the
presumption to be one of prospective application only. At the same time, Congress authorized
Treasury to issue regulations with retroactive effect from the date of the first public proposal or
—if “filed or issued” within eighteen months of a statutory change or to “prevent abuse”—from
the date of the statutory change. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101(a), 110
Stat. 1452, 1468–69 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012)).
222. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
223. Revenue Act of 1921 § 1314, 42 Stat. at 314 (emphases added).
224. My claim is not that this time period is when Congress started giving specific
rulemaking grants as well as general ones. As I discuss above at note 144, the provisions of the
Revenue Act of 1864 demonstrate the contrary. The extent to which Congress made specific
rulemaking delegations before 1913 has been somewhat underappreciated. Cf., e.g., Kristin E.
Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1537, 1565 (2006) (“The Revenue Act of 1916 introduced a few specific rulemaking grants.
Subsequent tax statutes included those and added more.” (footnote omitted)). Until I did this
study, I would have agreed completely with Professor Hickman’s characterization.
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with the view that tax regulations could not change, enlarge, or
modify the substance of the law to be obeyed by taxpayers, even if
225
regulations could legitimately control government employees.
Thus, my claim here is not that there was no distinction between
legislative and interpretative regulations before the APA. It is rather
that the only legitimate tax regulations were those that interpreted the
tax statutes.
More evidence that Treasury Regulations were viewed as
functioning solely to interpret the statutes comes from the legal
history of what is now I.R.C. § 7805(a), which grants general
authority for the “Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary,”
226
to issue all “needful rules and regulations.” Recall that the Civil
War statutes had contained not only similar general authority but also
227
multiple specific-authority provisions. This pattern continued after
the revival of the income tax in 1913, and by 1921 some legislators
were troubled by it. In the debate over the Revenue Act of 1921, for
example, Senator David Walsh complained that “[i]n more than 20
places in the bill the commissioner is given flexible authority for the
228
first time. That is a great departure from previous tax legislation.”
Eventually, however, Walsh explained his agreement to the various
specific grants of authority:
I wish to say . . . the language of this bill is so involved and the
meaning in many places is so obscure and almost nonunderstandable
that somebody ought to have discretion in administering its
provisions. . . . Under such circumstances there ought to be
[e]ntrusted to some authority the power to interpret them and to
229
exercise some discretion.

Walsh’s statement provides support for the proposition that the
specific delegations were no different in kind than the general ones:
they were interpretative.
By 1924, some congressmen were concerned enough about
Treasury’s discretion that they reintroduced the idea Congress used
in the Tariff Act of 1832, that the general rulemaking authority could
only be exercised if it was “not inconsistent with the laws of the

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See supra Part III.A.
I.R.C. § 7805(a).
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
61 CONG. REC. 6559, 6576 (1921) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
Id.
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230

United States.” The House bill proposed to put a similar qualifier in
the Revenue Act of 1924 so that the Commissioner had, with the
approval of the Secretary, the power to issue rules and regulations for
enforcement of that Act, but only if the rules did “not enlarge or
231
modify any provisions of this act and of any other law.” The
232
Conference Report accepted the Senate’s strike of that language.
Senator Reed Smoot explained that “[t]he words stricken out were
omitted as surplusage. There is no necessity for the provision,”
233
because “[n]o regulation of any department can set aside the law.”
The first discussion of a new idea (new, at least, as to tax
administration) that regulations could be both legislative and
legitimate appears in J. Hardy Patten’s extensive 1926 treatment of
the legal authority of Treasury Regulations, in which he strung
together several Supreme Court decisions to claim that “[a]s long as
Congress, in delegating legislative power to an executive or
administrative agency, finds an adequate necessity for the delegation
and prescribes a ‘standard’ or ‘rules of decision,’ it is not
234
unconstitutional as a pure ‘delegation of legislative power.’”
Accepting the idea that there could indeed be legitimate legislative
regulations, Patten nonetheless concluded that the majority of the
235
regulations administering the income tax were interpretative.
The first example of legitimate legislative regulations in tax
administration I can find came in 1928, when Congress explicitly gave
the Secretary the authority to make a substantive decision about
whom to tax. For years the question of how to tax a group of

230. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, § 9, 4 Stat. 583, 592; see supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
231. H.R. REP. NO. 68-844, at 31 (1924) (Conf. Rep.).
232. Id.
233. 65 CONG. REC. 7140 (1924) (statement of Sen. Reed Smoot). The qualifying language
was not in the final provision. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1001, 43 Stat. 253, 339.
234. Patten, supra note 39, at 473. Patten cites Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904),
and Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924). The latter case may be what caused concern to those
who, in 1924, sought to put the “not inconsistent with the laws” qualifier back into the general
authority statute. Cf. 65 CONG. REC. 3333 (1924) (statement of Rep. Joseph Deal) (“The
Supreme Court has rendered some decisions that would indicate that Congress has the right to
delegate the power of making rules and regulations, but there should be some limit as to the
extent of those rules and regulations.”).
235. See Patten, supra note 39, at 376 (“Interpretative regulations comprise the largest and
commonest variety [of Treasury Regulations].”). Note that I am not endorsing all of Patten’s
ideas, just pointing out what his ideas were.
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affiliated corporations had raged in the courts. In the Revenue Act
of 1928, Congress decided to punt the problem to Treasury, and thus
section 141 of the law specifically directed the “Commissioner, with
the approval of the Secretary,” to “prescribe such regulations as he
may deem necessary in order that the tax liability of an affiliated
group of corporations . . . may be determined . . . in such manner as
237
clearly to reflect the income and to prevent avoidance of tax.” Soon
238
enough, Treasury revised Regulations 75, providing just such rules.
The consolidated return statute was truly an unprecedented
239
rulemaking power. It was more than just another one of the many
provisions in specific sections that gave the Commissioner or the
Secretary the authority to issue rules. This was the power to decide
whom to tax, a qualitatively different delegation than any that had
come before. Accordingly, the drafting of Regulations 75 resembled
what Congress does when writing legislation: the regulation writers
held three days of hearings to receive public input before writing the
240
regulation. Professor Kenneth Davis also suggested that it was the
consolidated return statute that gave rise to Treasury’s theory that the
distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations lay in
241
the specificity of the rulemaking grant from Congress.
This move by Congress became much more common in post–
New Deal legislation. Contemporaries describe the period after 1933
as “marked by an unprecedented delegation of power to the
242
President and other executive officers to prescribe regulations.” The
distinction between legislative regulations and interpretative
regulations was quickly viewed as based on a notion of delegation of
powers—a view which most administrative law professors still teach
243
today.

236. See generally J. Hardy Patten, The Consolidated Return—1929 Model, 7 NAT’L INCOME
TAX MAG. 419 (1929).
237. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 141, 45 Stat. 791, 831.
238. See Patten, supra note 236, at 420.
239. See id. (describing Regulations 75 as “an innovation in Federal tax administration,”
which “present[s] the first production of legislative regulations en masse”).
240. Id. at 420 & n.9.
241. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 91 (1959). This is the student
version of Davis’s Administrative Law Treatise.
242. Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 259
(1938) (footnotes omitted).
243. Both Professors Lederman and Hickman have given complete and thorough
explorations of this concept in the context of the issue of authority. See generally Hickman,
supra note 12; Lederman, supra note 54.
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CONCLUSION
As a tax lawyer writing in the mid 1920’s, J. Hardy Patten was of
the opinion that most income-tax regulations were interpretative of
244
the tax statutes and not legislative. Given the history detailed in this
Article, it should not be surprising that the common view after
enactment of the APA was the same, finding a doctrinal home in the
idea that most Treasury Regulations fell into the APA’s
“interpretative” category of rules. Professor Davis put it this way:
“The great bulk of Treasury Regulations under the tax laws clearly
are interpretative rules, not legislative rules, despite the provision
of § 7805 . . . . Without the grant of power by § 7805, the power of the
245
Secretary or his delegate would be the same . . . .”
Yet this common view made Treasury Regulations exceptional
from the very start of the APA. Focus on the word “despite” in
Professor Davis’s quote. It implies that a general grant of authority
would normally result in legislative rules. That is certainly how
administrative scholars of the time defined legislative rules. For
example, Professor A.H. Feller put it this way:
The legislative regulation is an exercise of a permissive authority to
make a law to supplement or make effective the law passed by
Congress. It is a response to the authorization: “the administrator
may make such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out
246
the provisions of this section . . . .”

If categorization of Treasury Regulations as “interpretative” is, in
247
some sense, a pretextual fiction, it is one that has persisted.
Whether it should be abandoned because of changes in either tax
administration or administrative-law concepts since the APA is the
subject for future articles. The point of this Article has been to
caution against what Professor Richard Pierce might call a
248
“hypertextual” approach to the APA. Those who write in this area
244. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
245. DAVIS, supra note 241, at 87 (emphasis added). As others have well explained, some
regulations issued pursuant to specific statutes, such as the consolidated return statutes, were
viewed as subject to notice-and-comment process and were labeled “legislative.” Professor
Lederman gives an excellent summary of the contemporary thinking. See Lederman, supra note
54, at 654–59.
246. Feller, supra note 42, at 1320.
247. Professor Louis Eisenstein seemed to think so. See generally Eisenstein, supra note 42,
at 509–24 (describing the categorization of Treasury Regulations as interpretative as a myth).
248. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752, 777–78
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must not fall into the presentist fallacy of assuming that the terms of
the APA contain meaning independent of history and of the
administrative context to which they are applied. Certainly lessons
from other areas of legal study, such as administrative law, can add
249
great value to the study of tax administration. But it is not a oneway street; it should be a two-way conversation.

(1995) (criticizing the Court for relying too much on “the abstract meaning of a particular word
or phrase” without considering other evidence of its meaning in a particular statute).
249. One outstanding example of this can be found in Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax
Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 183 (1996).

